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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In 2004, Sherman Maxwell, who was doing business as Von Zippers Custom 
Cycles, entered into a joint venture with Small Block Enterprises, Inc. Under the parties' 
agreement, they would purchase, repair/refurbish, and re-sell all manner of vehicles 
(automobiles, pickup trucks, and watercraft), splitting the profits on a 50/50 basis. They 
also had one project where they built a motorcycle from the ground up, with the intent of 
selling it for a profit (again, to be split on a 50/50 basis). Generally speaking, Small 
Block was the "money" partner, buying totaled vehicles and/or purchasing the 
necessary parts, and Von Zippers was the "expertise" partner, doing all the actual work. 
Unfortunately, the business relationship between Von Zippers and Small Block 
fell apart after only a few months. After Mr. Maxwell sold the motorcycle he had been 
building with Small Block (which happened to have a motor whose "motor number," i.e., 
serial number, had apparently been gouged out) and failed to share the proceeds with 
Small Block, he was charged with three felonies: grand theft of the motorcycle; 
defacing, destroying, or obliterating a motor number; and knowingly selling a vehicle 
whose motor number has been defaced, destroyed, or obliterated. Following a jury trial, 
Mr. Maxwell was found guilty of all three felonies, received a suspended sentence and 
was placed on probation, and was ordered to pay restitution. 
On appeal, Mr. Maxwell presents three claims of error: (1) there is insufficient 
evidence to support the grand theft conviction because the trial evidence showed that 
Mr. Maxwell and Small Block were partners or joint venturers and, therefore, had equal 
rights of possession to the motorcycle; (2) the indictment was improperly amended to 
allege different offenses (stemming from the defaced, destroyed, or obliterated motor 
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number) than had been considered by the grand jury; and (3) even if the grand theft 
conviction can properly stand, the restitution award stemming from that count was 
improperly calculated. 
In response, the State controverts all of Mr. Maxwell's claims. With regard to the 
question of whether there was sufficient evidence of grand theft, the State argues that 
there is evidence from which the jury could have found that Mr. Maxwell was the original 
outright owner of the motorcycle; he sold it to Small Block's owners; and then he stole it 
back from them. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.13-26.) Alternatively, the State argues 
that even if the motorcycle was jointly owned by Mr. Maxwell and Small Block, there is 
evidence from which the jury could have found that Mr. Maxwell embezzled the 
proceeds of the sale of that motorcycle. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.26-29.) With 
regard to the question of whether the indictment was improperly amended, the State 
argues that the amendment did not allege different offenses. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.29-33.) Finally, with regard to the question of whether the restitution award was 
improperly calculated, the State argues that the precise argument presented on appeal 
was not made below and, therefore is not preserved. (Respondent's Brief, pp.34-35.) 
Alternatively, the State argues that, even if Mr. Maxwell's claim was adequately 
preserved, it fails on its merits. (Respondent's Brief, pp.35-36.) 
The present Reply Brief is necessary to address, and rebut, each of the 
arguments presented by the State. For the reasons set forth fully herein, Mr. Maxwell 
contends that the State's arguments are meritless. For that reason, and for the reasons 
set forth in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Maxwell requests that this Court vacate his 
convictions and sentences and order an acquittal on the grand theft charge and a 
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dismissal of the other two charges. Alternatively, he requests that the restitution 
amount awarded to National Indemnity Company (Small Block's insurer) be reduced by 
$5,000. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously set forth in 
Mr. Maxwell's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, need not repeated herein. 
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ISSUES 
1. Was sufficient evidence offered at Mr. Maxwell's trial to sustain his conviction for 
grand theft? 
2. Did the district court err in allowing the State to amend the indictment to allege 
different offenses than those considered by the grand jury? 





There Was Insufficient Evidence Offered At Trial To Sustain Mr. Maxwell's Conviction 
For Grand Theft 
A. Introduction 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Maxwell argued that there is insufficient evidence to 
support his grand theft conviction because the State failed to offer substantial, 
competent evidence as to one of the essential elements of that offense-that James 
and Diana Witherspoon were "owners" of the motorcycle he was alleged to have stolen. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.18-31.) Specifically, he argued that because the term "owner," as 
used within the theft statute, I.C. § 18-2403(1), is defined as someone having "a right of 
possession ... superior to that of the taker, obtainer or withholder," I.C. § 18-2402(6) 
(emphasis added), and the trial evidence clearly indicated that Mr. Maxwell was in a 
partnership or joint venture with one of the Witherspoon's companies, such that he had 
an equal right of possession to the motorcycle he is alleged to have stolen, he cannot 
be said to have committed a theft of the motorcycle. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-31.) 
In response, the State argues that the motorcycle was not partnership or joint 
venture property (Respondent's Brief, pp.19-25); the State assumes that the motorcycle 
was originally Mr. Maxwell's property, and asserts that Mr. Maxwell then sold it to the 
Witherspoons (before supposedly stealing it back) (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-19, 25-
26). Alternatively, the State argues that even if the motorcycle was partnership or joint 
venture property, Mr. Maxwell embezzled the proceeds of the sale of that motorcycle. 
( See Respondent's Brief, pp.26-29.) For the reasons set forth in detail below, the 
State's arguments are lacking in merit. 
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B. The State Failed To Offer Substantial, Competent Evidence Showing That 
Mr. Maxwell Took, Obtained, Or Withheld The Motorcycle From The "Owner" 
1. There Is No Competent Evidence To Suggest That Mr. Maxwell Ever Sold 
The Motorcycle To The Witherspoons 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Maxwell argued that there is no competent evidence 
that Mr. Maxwell ever sold the motorcycle to the Witherspoons because the only 
evidence that could support such a conclusion was the testimony of Mrs. Witherspoon, 
and her testimony was demonstrably false. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-6 n.4, pp.20-21.) In 
particular, Mr. Maxwell argued that since Mrs. Witherspoon conceded that she had no 
firsthand knowledge of the deals struck between her husband and Mr. Maxwell with 
regard to the motorcycle and the separate $5,000 loan, and that her understanding of 
those deals was based solely on the hearsay statements of her husband, and because 
Mrs. Witherspoon's testimony about those deals was controverted by that of her 
husband (the only State's witness with personal knowledge), Mrs. Witherspoon's 
assertion that she and her husband purchased the motorcycle from Mr. Maxwell is not 
competent evidence and cannot be used to sustain Mr. Maxwell's grand theft conviction. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.4-6 n.4, pp.20-21.) 
In response, the State asserts that there is, in fact, substantial, competent 
evidence that Mr. Maxwell sold the motorcycle to the Witherspoons. ( See Respondent's 
Brief, pp.13-19.) The State argues, in part, that Mr. Maxwell cannot now challenge the 
credibility of Mrs. Witherspoon, because evaluating her credibility was exclusively within 
the province of the jury. (Respondent's Brief, p.16.) The State further argues that 
because a bill of sale was created, a certificate of title was transferred to the 
Witherspoons, and the motorcycle was physically delivered to the Witherspoons, this is 
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further evidence of a sale. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-18.) These arguments are 
without merit. 
First, Mr. Maxwell is not seeking to challenge Mrs. Witherspoon's credibility per 
se. He has merely pointed out that because she has conceded that she has no 
personal knowledge of the facts which she testified to, and because that testimony is in 
conflict with that of her husband/business partner, the only State's witness with personal 
knowledge and the purported source of her own understanding, her testimony is not 
competent evidence upon which a jury's verdict can rest. This is not an argument 
concerning Mrs. Witherspoon's subjective credibility; rather; it is an assertion that, 
objectively speaking, no jury verdict ought to rest on such baseless evidence. 
Second, the State's reliance on the bill of sale, the certificate of title, and the 
transfer of physical possession is misplaced. Mr. Witherspoon testified that the $7,000 
purchase price appearing on the bill of sale and the title was "[j]ust an arbitrary amount" 
that he and Mr. Maxwell "came up with"1 (Tr. Vol. VI, p.32, L.24 - p.33, L.9, p.37, Ls.22-
25); the title was transferred to the Witherspoons, then Small Block, "[j]ust basically as 
security for [his] investment," not because he and his wife had actually purchased the 
motorcycle (Tr. Vol. IV, p.20, Ls.4-7; Tr. Vol. VI, p.35, Ls.1-19, p.38, Ls.1-3); and the 
motorcycle itself was transferred to the Witherspoons because Mr. Maxwell's "shop was 
jammed up" (Tr. Vol. IV, p.19, Ls.10-14). 
Third, at no point does the State attempt to explain how it was that the 
motorcycle could have been Mr. Maxwell's to sell. As even the State concedes Small 
1 It appears that the only reason a bill of sale was completed at all was so that the title 
could be transferred to Small Block. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.63, Ls.14-24.) 
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Block and Mr. Maxwell had an arrangement whereby Small Block would purchase 
vehicles, Mr. Maxwell would repair and refurbish those vehicles, and, together, Small 
Block and Mr. Maxwell would re-sell those vehicles and split the proceeds. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.1-2.) Further, the State concedes that the motorcycle project at 
issue in this case fell within the umbrella of this larger arrangement. (See Respondent's 
Brief, p.2.) Under these facts, the best interpretation of the arrangement between Small 
Block and Mr. Maxwell is that it was a partnership, or perhaps a joint venture, in which 
case the motorcycle would have been owned by the partnership (if, indeed, the 
relationship was a partnership) or it would have been jointly owned by the parties (if the 
relationship was a joint venture). (See Appellant's Brief, pp.23-27.) In neither case 
could he have sold the entire motorcycle to Small Block. Furthermore, even if the 
relationship was neither a partnership nor a joint venture, the State fails to explain how 
Mr. Maxwell could have, in his individual capacity, sold the entire motorcycle to Small 
Block. 
The reality is that there simply was no sale of the motorcycle by Mr. Maxwell to 
the Witherspoons or their company, Small Block. 
2. Insofar As The Motorcycle Was Titled In The Names Of The Witherspoons 
And/Or Small Block, That Fact Would Not Be Dispositive Of The Question 
Of Who The "Owner" Of The Motorcycle Was For Purposes Of Idaho's 
Theft Statute 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Maxwell argued that title alone was insufficient to 
show that the Witherspoons or Small Block owned the motorcycle. ( See Appellant's 
Brief, pp.21-22.) Because the State has not argued that title alone is sufficient to prove 
ownership (see generally Respondent's Brief), no further response is necessary herein. 
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3. The Evidence In This Case Establishes Von Zippers And Small Block Had 
Equal Rights Of Possession To The Motorcycle 
As noted, in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Maxwell argued that the relationship 
between Mr. Maxwell and Small Block was either a partnership or a joint venture and 
that, as such, he and the Witherspoons had equal rights of possession to the 
motorcycle.2 (Appellant's Brief, pp.23-27.) 
In response, the State does not challenge the assertion that relationship between 
Mr. Maxwell and Small Block was either a partnership or a joint venture; however, it 
does argue that the motorcycle was not partnership or joint venture property. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.19-25.) The State simply assumes that the motorcycle was 
Mr. Maxwell's property, which could then be sold to the Witherspoons. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.13-19, 25-26.) Alternatively, the State argues that even if the motorcycle was 
partnership or joint venture property, Mr. Maxwell embezzled the proceeds of the sale of 
that motorcycle. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.26-29.) These arguments lack merit. 
Initially, it is notable that the State fails to explain how it could be that, if 
Mr. Maxwell was in a partnership or joint venture with Small Block, he would have had 
ownership of the entire motorcycle (which Small Block had undoubtedly contributed 
significantly to) such that he could sell that motorcycle to Small Block. Under the 
State's theory that there was no partnership property (see Respondent's Brief, pp.20-
23), Mr. Maxwell would have only been able to sell the individual parts that he 
2 In his Appellant's Brief (see, e.g., p.21), Mr. Maxwell asserted that "the State has since 
conceded [in its post-trial briefing] the witherspoons did not have a superior right of 
possession based on a purchase of the motorcycle," and he cited pages 4 through 6 of 
the State's May 6, 2010 State's Response to Defendant's Motion for New Trial and 
Supporting Brief for that proposition. At this point, it appears that that assertion was 
made in error and it is hereby withdrawn. 
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contributed to the motorcycle, not the entire motorcycle. See I.C. § 53-3-204 (making it 
clear that if the property is not partnership property, it is the separate property of the 
partners). Accordingly, the State's claim that the motorcycle was not partnership 
property is nonsensical on its face. 
More importantly, as even the State concedes (see Respondent's Brief, p.21 ), 
under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, although there are certain guidelines for 
determining when property is partnership property, "[u]ltimately, it is the intention of the 
partners that controls whether the property belongs to the partnership or to one of the 
partners in their individual capacities .... " I.C. 53-3-204 cmt. 3. And, in this case, it is 
beyond cavil that the parties considered the motorcycle to be partnership property. It is 
undisputed that the objective was for both parties to contribute parts (for example, 
Mr. Maxwell contributed the frame and Small Block contributed the engine) in an effort 
to built a custom motorcycle which would then be sold as a single unit, with the parties 
to split the profits on a 50/50 basis. Indeed, as the State itself points out, "the intent of 
the parties, as testified to by James Witherspoon, [was] that Maxwell was only entitled 
to half of the profits of the sale of the motorcycle, not the motorcycle itself." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.23 (citing Tr., Vol. VI, p.35, L.1 - p.36, L.23, p.38, Ls.1-8).) 
Under these circumstances, there can be little doubt that the individual parts contributed 
by the two parties were intended to become part of the partnership's whole motorcycle. 
A similar analysis is required, and the same result must be reached, if the 
arrangement between Mr. Maxwell and Small Block was joint venture instead of a 
partnership. As the State concedes, "as with partnership law, whether property belongs 
to the joint venture or is the personal property of one or more of the joint venture 
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participants appears to be a matter of the parties' intent." (See Respondent's Brief, p.24 
(citing Costa v. Borges, 145 Idaho 353, 358-59 (2008)).) And again, because the 
parties' undeniable purpose was to put their individual contributions together into one 
completed motorcycle, and to sell that motorcycle as a single, complete unit, and then 
splits the profits on a 50/50 basis, there can be little doubt that the individual parts 
contributed by the two parties were intended to become part of the partnership's whole 
motorcycle. 
Finally, with regard to the State's alternative argument that, even if the 
motorcycle was partnership or joint venture property, there is still sufficient evidence to 
support a conclusion that Mr. Maxwell committed grand theft because the evidence 
could support a conclusion that Mr. Maxwell embezzled the motorcycle itself or Small 
Block's share of the proceeds of the sale of that motorcycle (see Respondent's Brief, 
pp.26-29), that argument also fails. As a preliminary matter, as a partner or joint 
venturer, Mr. Maxwell had every right to not only possess the motorcycle, but also to 
sell the motorcycle for the benefit of the partnership or joint venture. I.C. §§ 53-3-301 (a) 
(each partner is an agent who may carry on the business of the partnership), -401 (f) 
("Each partner has equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership 
business"); Rhodes v. Sunshine Mining Co., 113 Idaho 162, 166 (1987) (holding that 
participants in joint ventures share "mutual control or management of the enterprise"). 
Thus, the only way that Mr. Maxwell could have done anything improper would have 
been if he had sold the motorcycle for his own personal benefit. However, the State 
never charged Mr. Maxwell with theft by unauthorized control or embezzlement, and 
certainly the jury never found him guilty under any such theories. The indictment 
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alleged that Mr. Maxwell stole a motorcycle from the Witherspoons; it did not allege that 
he embezzled money from the partnership or the joint venture with Small Block. 
(R., pp.13-15 (original indictment), pp.128-30 (amended indictment).) Likewise, the jury 
was instructed that it should find Mr. Maxwell guilty of grand theft if it found that he stole 
a motorcycle from the Witherspoons; it do not address the question of whether he had 
embezzled money from the partnership or the joint venture with Small Block.3 (Jury 
Instruction No. 13.) Accordingly, the State's embezzlement theory, raised for the first 
time on appeal, is without merit. 
4. The Witherspoons Were Not "Owners" Of The Motorcycle By Virtue Of 
Any Sort Of Security Interest In That Motorcycle 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Maxwell argued that neither the Witherspoons nor 
Small Block had a valid security interest in the motorcycle and, even if they did, this 
alone was insufficient to show that either one owned the motorcycle. ( See Appellant's 
Brief, pp.27-31.) Because the State has not argued that title alone is sufficient to prove 
ownership (see generally Respondent's Brief), no further response is necessary herein. 
C. Conclusion 
Because the State failed to offer substantial, competent evidence establishing 
that either the Witherspoons or Small Block was the "owner" of the motorcycle, there is 
insufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Maxwell's grand theft conviction. Accordingly, 
Mr. Maxwell asks this Court to reverse his conviction. 
3 Theft by embezzlement includes an element that the jury was never asked to find in 
this case. "Embezzlemnent occurs when a person who has lawful possession of the 
property of another and then, with fraudulent intent, appropriates the property to his own 
use." State v. Stricklin, 136 Idaho 264, 269 (Ct. App. 2001 ); accord State v. Hamilton, 
129 Idaho 938, 940-41 (Ct. App. 1997). In this case, fraudulent intent was not among 
the elements that the jury was asked to find. (See Jury Instruction No. 13.) 
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II. 
The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Amend The Indictment To Allege 
Different Offenses Than Those Considered By The Grand Jury 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Maxwell argued that, by amending the indictment to 
conform to the evidence presented to the grand jury, the State changed the criminal 
acts alleged and, therefore, changed the offenses alleged. (Appellant's Brief, pp.31-38.) 
Specifically, he asserted that, by amending the indictment to allege that Mr. Maxwell 
had defaced, destroyed or obliterated a motor number, as opposed to a vehicle 
identification number (VIN), the State changed the criminal act (and, therefore, the 
offenses) alleged. (Appellant's Brief, pp.31-38.) 
In response, the State contends that offenses alleged did not change because 
"Maxwell was not charged with obliterating a different number or selling a different 
motorcycle with the amendment" (Respondent's Brief, p.32), and that "[t]he only change 
was in the name given the object of those acts-the number itself" (Respondent's Brief, 
p.33). This argument, however, is without merit, for the object of Mr. Maxwell's actions 
was initially alleged to be a motorcycle, but it was later alleged to be an engine. This 
alteration of the charging document fundamentally changed the physical act alleged. As 
noted in Mr. Maxwell's Appellant's Brief (p.36 n.30), it was akin to changing a charging 
document to allege a different rape victim. 
In addition, the State suggests that there is Idaho Court of Appeals authority in 
support of its argument in this case. It cites State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920 (Ct. App. 
1997), and asserts that: 
In that case the district court allowed the prosecution to amend the 
charge alleging Owen stole a Jenn-Air "refrigerator" to allege he stole a 
Jenn-Air "range." [Owen, 129 Idaho] at 933, 935 P.2d at 197. Owen's 
argument that this amendment was error had "no merit." !g. at 934, 935 
13 
P.2d at 197. In addition to the issue not being preserved, the amendment 
merely conformed the pleading to the evidence presented both at trial and 
in the preliminary hearing "showing that the property subject to the alleged 
theft was a range, not a refrigerator." lg_. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.32.) However, in Owen, the defendant-appellant apparently 
made no contention that the amendment was improper under I.C.R. 7(e) or the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it charged a different offense.4 
See Owen, 129 Idaho at 934. Accordingly, Owen is of no value to this Court in 
resolving the question of whether the State's amendment of the indictment in this case 
impermissible charged a different offense. 
111. 
The District Court Erred In Its Computation Of The Restitution Owed To National 
Indemnity 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Maxwell argued that, assuming his convictions stand, 
the district court nevertheless erred in its computation of the restitution owed to National 
Indemnity. (Appellant's Brief, pp.38-42.) The crux of this argument is that, of the 
$15,044.11 in restitution awarded to National Indemnity for its payments to its insured, 
Small Block, $5,000 of that award was unwarranted since the trial evidence showed that 
$5,000 of the claim paid out by National Indemnity actually arose out of a separate 
transaction (a loan) between the Witherspoons and Mr. Maxwell and, therefore, did not 
result from Mr. Maxwell's criminal conduct in this case. 
4 Furthermore, as the State notes (see Respondent's Brief, p.32), the issue of whether 
the amendment was proper was not preserved by the defendant-appellant anyway, so 
any comment on the merits of the defendant-appellant's argument by the Court of 
Appeals would have been pure dicta. 
14 
In response, the State offers three arguments. First, the State contends that the 
specific argument presented by Mr. Maxwell on appeal was not made below and, 
therefore, is not properly before this Court. (Respondent's Brief, pp.34-35.) Second, 
the State argues that even if Mr. Maxwell's claim can be considered by this Court, it fails 
on its merits because there is some evidence (in the form of Mrs. Witherspoon's 
testimony) to support the notion that the $5,000 in question did actually relate to 
Mr. Maxwell's crimes, and this evidence, although demonstrably false, cannot be 
questioned. (Respondent's Brief, p.35.) Finally, the State asserts that, even if the 
alleged $5,000 loss in question arose out of a separate debt owed by Mr. Maxwell to the 
Witherspoons, it was nevertheless correctly made part of the restitution in this case 
because, had Mr. Maxwell not committed his crimes in this case, he would have had the 
money to pay this debt to the Witherspoons. (Respondent's Brief, p.36.) For the 
reasons set forth in detail below, the State's arguments are without merit. 
The State's first contention is that Mr. Maxwell's argument about National 
Indemnity having overpaid the Witherspoons by $5,000 is "unpreserved for appeal" 
"[b]ecause the district court was never asked to determine whether National had 
overpaid because the $5,000 was a loan wholly independent of the motorcycle" and, 
therefore, "there are no findings of fact on this point." (Respondent's Brief, pp.34-35.) 
This argument by the State, however, overlooks the fact that it was the State's burden 
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the victim suffered an economic 
loss, and that the loss was caused by the defendant's criminal conduct. See I.C. § 19-
5304(6); State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602-06 (2011 ). Accordingly, the claim on 
appeal, at its heart, is simply a claim that the State failed to meet its burden of proof in 
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this regard. 5 And the question of whether sufficient evidence has been offered can 
always be challenged on appeal. See, e.g., Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 445-47 
(1953) (entertaining a challenge to a damages award in a civil case based on 
insufficient evidence, apparently made for the first time on appeal, and vacating that 
damages award for lack of evidence).6 
The State's second contention is that Mr. Maxwell's claim fails on its merits 
because there is some evidence, i.e., Mrs. Witherspoon's testimony, which supports the 
notion that the $5,000 in question did actually relate to Mr. Maxwell's crimes, and this 
evidence cannot be questioned. (Respondent's Brief, p.35.) This argument overlooks 
the fact that, while great deference is given to the factual findings made by the district 
court, they must still be supported by substantial and competent evidence. Corbus, 150 
Idaho at 602; Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 637-38 (2006). And, in this case, 
because Mrs. Witherspoon's testimony was demonstrably false, it was neither 
substantial nor competent and, therefore, it was inadequate to support the finding that 
5 State v. Dorsey, 126 Idaho 659 (Ct. App. 1995), and State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 
830 (Ct. App. 2011), are both distinguishable from the present case. In Dorsey, the 
defendant-appellant had raised a strictly legal challenge to the State's request for 
restitution below; he failed to contest the restitution calculation below. Dorsey, 126 
Idaho at 661-62. Thus, when he sought to challenge the restitution calculation for the 
first time on appeal, the Court of Appeals held that he had waived that challenge by 
failing to present it below. Id. at 662. In Mosqueda, it is not entirely what the defendant-
appellant had raised below, but he clearly had not presented the specific legal challenge 
that he sought to raise on appeal. See Mosqueda, 150 Idaho at 833. Thus, the Court 
of Appeals held that that legal challenge was waived. Id. In this case, in contrast, 
Mr. Maxwell challenged the restitution calculation below, and that is precisely the 
challenge he presents on appeal. 
6 The Idaho Court of Appeals recently held that "restitution proceedings are civil in 
nature." Mosqueda, 150 Idaho at 834. Thus, a conclusion that the State met its burden 
of proof with regard to restitution in a criminal case is indistinguishable from a damages 
award in a civil case. 
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the $5,000 in question was part of Small Block's economic loss caused by 
Mr. Maxwell's criminal conduct in this case. 
The State's third contention is that, even if the alleged $5,000 loss in question 
arose out of a separate debt owed by Mr. Maxwell to the Witherspoons, it was 
nevertheless correctly made part of the restitution in this case because, had 
Mr. Maxwell not committed his crimes in this case, he would have had the money to pay 
this debt to the Witherspoons. (Respondent's Brief, p.36.) This argument overlooks the 
fact that restitution is only available for losses which are proximately caused by the 
defendant's crime, see Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602-06, and Mr. Maxwell's failure to repay 
the $5,000 loan is far too attenuated to have been proximately caused by his crimes in 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, as well as in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Maxwell 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and sentences and order an 
acquittal on the grand theft charge and a dismissal of the other two charges. 
Alternatively, he requests that the restitution amount awarded to National Indemnity 
Company be reduced by $5,000. 
DATED this 11 th day of April, 2012. 
ERIK R. LE TINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
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